Friday, February 12, 2021

Measuring Poverty

    A single parent and worker who makes barely enough to get by and provide for their kids may benefit from receiving health insurance coverage or a housing subsidy. In the case they do receive health insurance coverage because of some governing entity, I can individually make the assessment that they're probably better off. It's reasonable to assume that by covering certain costs, the coverage will increase their general welfare. However, "official" poverty measures, which are based on income and often misreported income do not reflect increases in welfare in many circumstances. In this case, the worker receiving health coverage will not see this reflected in official poverty measures of income; However, these changes would be present in poverty measures of consumption. Income-based poverty measures tend to not adjust for inflation and capture demographic, such as the college educated, who might not fit in the basket of "people we need to help the most." The picture painted by income based measures of poverty are incomplete and adjusting for its shortfalls paints a better picture for analysis and shows the effectiveness of anti-poverty programs.

    Illustrating a complete picture is important as it allows us to create programs that better identify issues and push back against false narratives such as an increasing welfare state hindering the well being of people in the United States. Official poverty is "determined by comparing the pre-tax money income of a family or an unrelated individual to a predetermined poverty threshold." (Meyer, Sullivan 2009) There are many angles we can use to attack how we determine poverty, much more than a single blog post warrants, but one of the main critiques is what pre-tax money income captures. Our single parent worker's health coverage wouldn't be captured by pre-tax money; nor would an EITC expansion or the free lunch offered to help his child. In fact, pre-tax money wouldn't include any noncash benefits which have been the basis of many programs since the Great Society. These noncash benefits should be included in these measures as they reflect changes in consumption; they "have an important effects on the resources available for consumption." 

    One old study that expresses this flawed logic is Hoynes et al. (2006) They found that "despite robust growth in real per capita GDP over the last three decades, the U.S. poverty rate has changed very little." The problem with their conclusion is their use of non-elderly pre-tax money income poverty - for all the reasons stated above. They found that macroeconomic conditions and employment are only responsible for a one percent point decrease in official poverty from 1980 to 2003. In fact, once you incorporate the changing employment of women, poverty rises over this period. Their research "shows" that the falling share of married couples shows a strong decline in poverty and that anti-poverty programs don't aid these people which opens up discussion for them doing the opposite. However, this is far from the case. Once you examine alternative measures of income, once you account for taxes and noncash benefits, once you account for the entire population and not restrict the demographics you're dealing with, once you account for consumption, you get a much different story. It is true, that an increase in single parent families might lead to an increase in poverty, this is both true intuitively and reflected in data, but it is also true that noncash benefits, increases in education and anti-poverty programs do find a decrease in poverty. For instance, investment in education predicts a large reduction in poverty when looking at consumption data, but little to no effect when looking at income data. Indeed, Bruce Meyer and James Sullivan find that when "[you move] from traditional income-based measure of poverty to a consumption-based measure, and, crucially, [adjust] for bias in price indices [you find] that the poverty rate declined by 26.4 percentage points between 1960 and 2010, with 8.5 percentage points of that decline occurring since 1980." A large portion of this decline can be attributed to social security and changes in tax policy such as the EITC. Other programs tend to be less beneficial, but you can also attribute those issues to misreporting and overall design of said programs that create narrow paths of families and individuals receiving said benefits. (Just give people money!) 

    Going off of what I've written above, there are usually many angles you can "uncover" to show the benefits of cash and noncash benefits. There has been much ado lately about a child allowance, a policy I think would do a lot of good in the U.S., not just by making people better off, but by easing political tensions by addressing economic distress. For instance, a child allow is an extremely effective way to reduce child poverty with estimates of a 200-300 per mouth allowance reducing child poverty by nearly 50 percent. There is also the political appeal that people across the political spectrum can endorse. The cost of raising a child is one of the main reasons why people have abortions; by expensing the cost of raising a child we can reduce the number of abortions that people have. A robust approach to welfare can do a lot of good and we should be confident in the socio-economic benefits.

    Cuts to programs such as the AFDC during the 90s "welfare reform" created unintended consequences. This study finds that, although "welfare reform may have had favorable effects on [the] social behaviours of mothers( at least in terms of reduced crime and increased civic participation in the form of voting), the intergenerational effects on social behavior were not favorable, particular for boys, and may have hindered the affected youths' socioeconomic trajectories." These negative social behaviours included "decreased volunteering among girls, increases in skipping school, damaging property, fighting among boys, and increases in smoking and drug use." Many of these reforms were made on the basis of being "pro-family" yet outcomes of those policies seem to reject the goals. The cases where we see the most benefits across all demographics, including strengthening families, is when we have a more robust approach to welfare policy. 

    If I don't think of a segue, I just don't end up doing one. It's my blog! So, at the end here, I'm just going to address a fallacy about the welfare state. There's an argument that the welfare state "encourages families to split up" that I don't find very convincing. It's been dying out, but the general rhetoric still pops up from time to time and I think we should formally eliminate it form our list of primary concerns. There used to be a strong correlation between the robustness of welfare and single motherhood. Something something endogeneity...

Let's take two assertions. 

- Regions with a relatively high number of single mothers are more inclined to pass generous benefits that help those people.

- Regions that culturally accept single mothers are more inclined to pass generous benefits that help those people.

These might (as I say sarcastically; it definitely does!) cause a false positive correlation and if you adjust for fixed effects, this relationship disappears for white people, but remains for black people. Hoynes then found that the relationship between the robustness of welfare and single motherhood in black families disappears when you account for migration; Robust welfare doesn't cause families to break up, but people more likely to be or become single mothers will move to areas with robust welfare policies.

How rational of them...

Saturday, January 23, 2021

Coffee Beans, Copper and Monetary Policy, Oh My!

NGDP targeting? Inflation? Nominal Wages?
Let's take a step out of the academic world. In my opinion these policies are functionally similar and the competence of the monetary authority is what is at play. Establishing a make-up policy is more important.
Say the monetary authority determines the interest rate,
Interest Rate = 4 + 3(inflation - target) + 1(output gap)
Let's take one step back into the academic world. Under an inflation targeting regime, the output gap coefficient would be zero. Now let's take one step out of the academic world. Our monetary authority wouldn't completely ignore the output gap. They wouldn't ignore any piece of data that they think would relate to their decisions to execute a "sound" monetary policy. Hence the phrase, "flexible [insert target] target" where the monetary authority will look to a wide variety of variables to determine the current stance on monetary policy. 
Perhaps you're the monetary authority in Costa Rica, the price of coffee or bananas may be of importance. Perhaps you're the monetary authority in Chile and you want to put weight on the price of copper. Perhaps you're the monetary authority in Singapore and you want to put weight on the exchange rate.
This is often a critique against restrictive monetary regimes, as done by Svensson here on NGDP targeting. 
Recall the equation above, 
Interest Rate = 4 + 3(inflation - target) + 1(output gap)
A nominal GDP target would replace the output gap term with an output growth term and the coefficients on inflation and output growth would be equal - this puts weight on the variable measuring real activity in contrast to an inflation target. Let's take a step back into the academic world. In his paper, Svensson contends that NGDP is too restrictive and while concerns may be valid these concerns aren't functionally different to me once we take a step back out of the academic world. While we're still in, the NGDP target restricts you from looking at variables that aren't inflation and output growth and says that you put equal weight on both of them. As said above, you might want to be flexible, you might want to care about other things and a flexible inflation target would be better. Now, with a foot back out of the academic world, all central banks are always "flexible." Central banks will always take in a large amount of data and go through a process of determining the stance of monetary policy. A restrictive rules based approach isn't going to happen. Even given this, it isn't clear to me that the differences in targets would actually produce drastically different results when observing monetary choices and the competency of the monetary authority at a given point in time.
NGDP still has value:
- Monetary policy is, in large part, about expectations. The relative simplicity of NGDP, or better phrased, "targeting a growth in nominal income", makes setting expectations easier. I mean, just listen to Fed officials talk about the future under it's current inflation targeting regime.... Set up the actual NGDP path and the target path and communicate what you're doing with rates relative to the gap. The two values under an NGDP target are easily observed which contrasts with the unobservable values put into the Fed's reaction function. 
- Selgin and Sheedy write about market efficiencies that would be associated with a NGDP target. Selgin writes about "credit-debtor justice", and in his paper he summarizes how a NGDP target would increase allocative efficiency by allowing for a more counter-cyclical policy while an inflation target would decrease it. Sheedy shows that various households do not have access to financial tools that would help them deal with unexpected shocks to their nominal income. (Something, something 400 dollars...) Firms and various industries do have access to these financial tools and they can equity finance instead of debt finance. A monetary policy that allows for a more counter-cyclical inflation, such as a NGDP target, aids this issue by decreasing the real interest rate on household debt when real output is low.
- By giving inflation and output equal weight, NGDP targeting signals what to do during a supply shock. Other monetary regimes make this less obvious, The simplicity and clarity of equal weights has a bigger priority, in my opinion, over small changes to find theoretically optimal tradeoffs, especially since NGDP is probably "good enough", in many models. Also, models play off the real world, and since we don't perfectly model the real world... we're fine! Factor this into the fact that central banks are inherently "flexible" as said above, and you see why these policies are functionally the same with one step into the real world.
Now, any regime has critiques and I think the critique below of NGDP targeting is valuable, but fixable. (Politics aside)
NGDP Growth = Inflation + Real Output Growth
We know that real output growth tracks productivity growth over the long run. (Btw, listen to this!) If productivity growth is low over a decent stretch of time, for any given NGDP target, inflation would be high. However, we can also change the target every few years. We might set a rule where we update our target every X amount of years based on productivity and overall macro trends.
Recall our equation above, 
Interest Rate = 4 + 3(inflation - target) + 1(output gap)
A level target would replace all growth rate terms with "level-deviation" terms and it's easy to see why a theoretical make-up policy has bigger implications in the real world.
The Fed's new AIT isn't exactly a level target, but it is a form of make-up policy and we're the implications of that right now.
Now, what's the real point of this post? Everything and nothing. Lots of these distinctions don't matter. Some of these distinctions can matter more than others. Really, the point of this post is just me saying this:
- The target in of itself probably isn't functionally different in a real world despite many academic debates surrounding it. While different targets allow for different things to be "seen" better or worse, these things can be done under any regime given that central banks take in a large amount of data.
- While these distinctions may not be different by much, NGDP targeting has a lot going for it over other options and some distinctions may be more relevant than others. Despite this, some of the issues done under inflation target didn't have to happen even if NGDP makes them "less likely" by being a better lens to see the stance of monetary policy through.
- What really matters is a form of make-up policy to address monetary concerns by making up for past mistakes.
- Also, I just wanted to post something on my blog. :) 

Saturday, August 15, 2020

Supply-Side Shocks Don't Cause Ample Increases in Nominal Income and U.S. History

Starting off a blog or using a story to segue into an economic topic always felt weird to me. Even what I just wrote seems out of place so I normally avoid doing it. That being said, I should get used to doing it so forgive the introduction.

Someone recently made a comment on how history is taught, at least in the United States. He proposed that history be taught through a "civic and law" lens as a way to look at it through a more objective lens to meet subjective conclusions. As it stands now, history curriculum's are often taught through an extremely subjective lens that doesn't allow for "thought to flourish" and attempts to grasp too many subject areas. The last part of his assertion, the "grasping too many subject areas", caught my attention the most. By doing this, you create diluted conclusions about history and amplify disingenuous information. 

As an example, I always found the way that economic history was taught in high schools to be fairly grotesque. The importance of monetary policy in economic downturns is under-emphasized to the point where people have a misguided or confused opinion on the reasons for specific downturns which creates a faulty foundation for analyzing current and future economic events. 

In her defense, my history teacher publicly admitted that economic history was her weakest area(and she shouldn't be expected to be an expert in this area, echoing what I said earlier), but I remember learning in class that the 70s inflation was mostly caused by a supply shock, a rise in oil prices. I now strongly dispute this notion.

Supply-side shocks don't cause ample increases in nominal income. It was monetary policy, rather than supply-side effects, that caused "The Great Inflation" of the 70s. Economists felt as though there was more slack in the economy despite high inflation.

But don't just listen to me, listen to Athanasios Orphanides who claims, "that loose monetary policy was the outcome of mis-perceptions about potential output rather than of inflation tolerance" and Clarida, Gali, Gertler who claim, "that weak policy reaction to expected inflation led to indeterminacies."

In mainstream economics, most people generally accept the notion that "business cycle fluctuations in production are best analyzed from a starting point that sees them as fluctuations around the sustainable long-run trend (rather than as declines below some level of potential output." This line of thinking contrasts the views of the Federal Reserve and policy advisors in the 60s who thought potential output was a level of output above the trend level of output. Arthur Okun, former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, talks about how "the strategy of economic policy was reformulated in the sixties." Economic policy was going to be based around achieving their definition of potential output rather than looking at general progress. "The focus on the gap between potential and actual output provided a new scale for the evaluation of economic performance, replacing the dichotomous business cycle standard which viewed expansion as satisfactory and recession as unsatisfactory." As long as potential output was not reached, expansionary monetary policy was needed to reach that level of output. This line of thinking was also established due to the Fed thinking policy wasn't expansionary enough during the 1957-60 recessions.(In isolation, they were correct)

This way of thinking about output made "The Great Inflation" inevitable. The Council of Economic Advisor's 1969 Economic Report shows that economists and policy advisors thought potential GDP was substantially higher than actual GDP. Today's estimates of potential output align with the Milton Friedman view of "fluctuations around a long-run trend". Modern estimates also show that the output gap was much lower in the 60s.

Essentially, old economists thought that the economy was below capacity at the time. In their eyes, this meant that higher inflation could still decrease unemployment so the Fed believed higher inflation, or, a more expansionary monetary policy was needed and desirable. Modern models and data suggest we were not below capacity at the time, meaning monetary policy was unnecessarily expansionary leading to inflation running rampant. That being said, even if we had better models at the time it would be rather difficult to know what the natural rate of output was in real time. This is why Friedman and other monetarists advocated for targeting things like inflation or money supply aggregates rather than output gaps which are faulty to deal with in real time. In addition to this information, Christina Romer shows that the mainstream view at the time was that monetary policy couldn't check inflation. This meant the Federal Reserve didn't exogenously stabilize inflation, when they could have.

To re-iterate, the Federal Reserve's views on the output gap and it's relation to effective monetary policy caused them to pursue a highly expansionary policy. They also believed that they couldn't check inflation and get a tight grip on it which lead to a high, loose and mishandled monetary policy which caused "The Great Inflation". 

Monday, April 6, 2020

Venezuela: Its Not The Oil

There's a common misconception that the collapse of the Venezuelan economy was due to eroded oil markets and U.S. sanctions. This is usually used as a defense for big government programs, and while those programs are defensible and valid, this defense of it isn't. 

Venezuela's RGDP growth started declining far before the collapse in the oil markets. In fact, it happened about a year-18 months after, at around 2013. Oil prices were also stable around this time and didn't decline until about a year later. US Sanctions didn't truly vamp up until the start of the Trump administration and sanctions under the Obama administration mainly targeted oligarchs. Rich people losing money doesn't typically cause humanitarian crises. Inflation also started to rise in 2013 along with the initial decline in RGDP before the oil market crash. Other countries that heavily depend on oil such as Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Kuwait, Qatar, Angola, Alegria, and Brunie aren't seeing Venezuela's problems. There just isn't a case to be made for blaming Venezuela's humanitarian crisis on oil.

Thursday, February 20, 2020

The Housing Shortage: Worse Than We Thought

New Housing Units authorized are low compared to previous business cycles.

Once you divide the number of units being approved by the number of households than things get even worse. It's not only less construction compared to normal expansionary cycles, but it's lower than half of the recessions we've had.

The current housing supply is far less elastic than in the past. And you know what that means...

Thursday, January 9, 2020

Yang's UBI Justifications


  • Everyone receives $X per year after taxes.
  • So, Income = (1-t)*Pretax + UBI

So, Andrew Yang cites a Roosevelt Institute as a justification for his UBI. He claims that a UBI would increase growth enough to finance a substantial portion of the UBI. 

The Roosevelt Institute projected that the economy will grow by approximately $2.5 trillion

The paper simulated 12 different scenarios. These are the scenarios for $1,000 a month for every adult.  

Yang cherry-picked the two scenarios with the highest growth and left two where there was minimal or no growth. The two scenarios that show high growth assume that the UBI is 100% deficit-financed. They're under the assumption that you don't pay for the UBI so it would make no sense to use them if Yang wants to pay for it without deficit spending.

Scenario 6 uses the Levy model which simulated a fully tax-funded UBI. Scenario 6 is a flat read line, meaning they found no impact on real output. They wanted to take into account the higher marginal propensity to consume of poor people so they made scenario 12. The Levy model explicitly ignores the costs of lower savings rates (which doesn't make sense if you're trying to calculate long-run effects) and they found some real output growth at $500 billion. That's 5 times lower than the number Yang cited.

Yang's own evidence doesn't say a UBI will grow the economy as much as he says it will and he also has some extreme shortfalls in spending. Although he has added a few new methods of taxation like a financial transaction tax(which generates low revenue anyways), a VAT, stimulus and cutting/using current welfare spending still creates a massive shortfall in spending.

Thursday, November 7, 2019

Medicare For All Can Work, But We Shouldn't Pursue It

Debating the logistics of recent healthcare proposal is futile since they all would work if implemented and would be vastly better than our current system; however, that doesn't mean we should definitely pursue one of these plans, Medicare For All. 

What are the best Arguments Against Single-payer Healthcare?

1) It's electorally damaging. The public option polls around the 70% range for voters. This is a very high percentage, particularly considering the current level of polarization in U.S. politics. There's virtually no other salient topic that is this popular with Americans. M4A, on the other hand, polls in the 40% region. A cut of 30% in popularity will make people less likely to vote for you. It wouldn't cause a collapse of the Democrats, but marginal races, like the presidency, or counties that moderates fought so hard to get in 2018, would be in jeopardy. 

2) It's politically untenable. Any healthcare bill proposed would need some amount of support from Republican Senators. This is simply a reality of the Senate with its current make up. Going back to the polls, the public option polls in the mid 40% range among Republicans, whereas M4A is around 15%. This means that Republican senators in the purplish-red states could be incentivized to support a public option or face backlash. Opposing M4A would not only help them among their base, but with independents as well, and would be a smart political move. Before you claim that Republicans wouldn't vote for a public option anyways, the topic of healthcare is very salient. Republicans could have repealed Obamacare, but thanks to moderate Republicans, like McCain, their efforts were thwarted. Healthcare is one of the few topics both sides may be able to come together on.

3) It is expensive. MFA is more expensive than a public option. Estimates suggest that M4A would cost about $2.5 trillion per year, and federal expenditures would increase by $32.0 trillion over the next ten years. To put this into perspective, the Iraq War cost us about 2 trillion a year and the annual cost of M4A is roughly 62% of the size of the annual budget for 2017, and 75% of current annual revenues. 

But, other countries, like Canada and the United Kingdom, have a singleplayer system. If they can find a way to pay for it, so can we, right? Not quite, not only is it inaccurate to equate single-payer and universal healthcare, but it is also disingenuous to equate Bernie Sanders' healthcare plan with single-payer plans across the world. M4A would cover hospital visits, primary care, medical devices, lab services, maternity care, and prescription drugs as well as vision and dental benefits. By contrast, the Canadian system doesn't cover vision and dental care, prescription drugs, and rehabilitative and home services. Two-thirds of Canadians take out private insurance plans in order to cover these costs. You seem similar things in Northern European countries or countries like Taiwan and Australia. Furthermore, M4A gets rid of out-of-pocket spending, excluding prescription drugs. This means that there would be no costs of going to the doctor and no copayments when you go to the emergency room. Most international single-payer systems require some form of payment for most services, at a low cost. For example, in Australia, people pay 15 percent of the cost of visiting a doctor. 

The money will have to come from increases in taxes, and it will be difficult to not raise taxes on the middle class. Elizabeth Warren just released a plan that comes close to not doing so, but it's unclear if she will actually raise enough revenue. Also, due to the incidence of payroll taxes, it may cause a tax increase for the middle class anyways. As most labour economists will tell you, labour supply is very inelastic. If a new payroll tax is introduced, decreasing workers' wages, most workers will simply continue to work the same amount of hours or only work slightly less. This means that this is an efficient revenue source... but the tax incidence falls almost entirely on workers.

Healthcare costs will always outpace GDP because of the Baumol effect. While a lot of progressive policies are fine on there own, collectively they can be very damaging. Countries like Sweden and the UK tried to implement these extensive policies in the 20th century and it failed. Things like transaction fees destroyed the Swedish stock exchange in the 80s and that was before high-frequency trading was really a thing. It took extensive neoliberal market reforms to get these countries back on track to being the desirable welfare states we know today.

4) M4A is no better than a public option. It could be argued that these downsides would be worth it if M4A was truly the best option we have, but this is clearly not the case. Multi-payer system, such as in Germany and Switzerland, routinely meet and exceed the performance of single-payer systems, such as the UK and Canada. 

M4A is simply not worth it, politically, fiscally, or electorally.